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Introduction 
 
Social innovation has been the focus of an increasing scholarly attention over the last decade 
(Howaldt & Schwarz 2010; Moulaert et al. 2013). This literature, however, has struggled with 
definitional problems and has remained rather descriptive and under-theorized, with only 
limited connections with broader theories in organization studies (Nicholls & Murdock 2012). 
Typically, it has been suggested that social innovation is characterized by specific diffusion 
(or “scaling up”) mechanisms that aim for wide replication and adoption, rather than control 
and profits for the pioneer innovators (Mulgan et al. 2007; Murray et al. 2010). Besides a lack 
of empirical validation, this hypothesis has also insufficiently been connected with theories 
that precisely focus on how new institutional arrangements emerge, are diffused and impact 
the broader institutional landscape, i.e. institutional entrepreneurship (Dorado 2005; Garud et 
al. 2002; Leca et al. 2008; Maguire et al. 2004) and more broadly institutional work 
(Lawrence & Suddaby 2006; Lawrence et al. 2009). This gap is even more surprising that 
most social innovations precisely aim to solve a social problem by challenging extant 
institutional arrangements, at least through discursive work theorizing intended institutional 
changes. 
 
This paper contributes to filling this gap by exploring the diffusion patterns of a social 
innovation embodied by “Smart” (now SMartbe), a mutual non-profit organization 
introducing new practices on the Belgian labor market. In the late 1990s, Smart developed a 
new employment scheme designed to provide better income security to artists. Throughout 
the years, Smart has broadened the scope of its roles and target audience to become a 
multiple-arms structure (employer, service provider, worker union, etc.) that supports all the 
“creative professionals” whose activity is characterized by intermittency and project-based 
work.  
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Our research questions can be summarized as follows. First, we examine how this innovative 
employment scheme has been diffused, and in particular how the gradual extension of 
Smart’s roles and target audience across established category borders has influenced the 
institutional work process. Second, based on how other actors in the field have reacted to and 
been influenced by the diffusion of Smart’s new scheme, we explore how the latter has 
impacted the institutional landscape and regulatory framework around employment in 
Belgium. Third, in responding to these first two sets of questions, we examine the interactions 
between the social innovator (Smart as an organization) and the diffusion of the innovation in 
its environment.  
 
Based on our findings, two key contributions are identified, each of which is likely to enrich 
our understanding of social innovation diffusion and more broadly institutional work 
trajectories. First, our exploration of the Smart case shows how the deliberate broadening of 
its roles and target audience category has both stimulated Smart’s growth and centrality in the 
labor market, and maximized stakeholder attention and criticism so as to fragilize its position. 
Indeed, by gradually extending its roles from simple service provider to also employer and 
workers’ representative, and by targeting an increasing number of professions, from “artistic” 
to “creative” and now “project-based” workers, Smart has moved away from its initial 
“experimental” sub-field (i.e. services in the arts sector) towards a broader cross-category 
positioning that has boosted its membership and thus its negotiation power on the whole labor 
market. This positioning, however, has also attracted criticism from a number of stakeholders 
who felt threatened by the “unorthodox” growth of Smart challenging traditional field 
boundaries and stakeholder negotiation schemes. On the one hand, such a cross-border 
diffusion may be a privileged, or even the only available growth avenue, for social 
innovations that emerge in strongly institutionalized fields a priori less permeable to bottom-
up innovations (Hargadon & Douglas 2001). On the other hand, however, cross-border 
diffusion exposes the innovator to hostility from established stakeholders (Leblebic et al. 
1991). 
 
Second, the findings show that despite such criticism and opposition to the social innovator 
by a set of stakeholders who see their relevance and power position challenged by the cross-
border diffusion work, the innovation itself pursues its diffusion through adoption by other 
actors. In other words, while the position of Smart as an organization is under attack, the 
innovative employment scheme finds fertile ground among different stakeholders eager to 
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adopt it, even in some cases those who frontally oppose the pioneer social innovator. It is thus 
suggested that the extension of roles and professional target categories by Smart has brought 
about a public debate extending beyond the diffusion trajectory of one particular organization 
and likely to affect the cognitive representations of the labor market as a whole. This may 
lead the social innovation to a level of “irreversibility” regardless of what happens to the 
social innovator itself. This is consistent with other studies examining the diffusion of 
innovative organizational forms that survive their initial promoters such as social enterprise 
(Tracey et al. 2011). However, in this case, what has been diffused is not an organizational 
form (here criticized for its gradual complexification) but rather a multi-dimensional 
innovation challenging the established actor categories in the labor market. Indeed, Smart’s 
employment scheme has induced a new combination of roles (new intermediary acting as 
both employer and worker representative) and the extension of traditional professional 
categories, leading to a new broad category of “project-based workers”, that has challenged 
the whole labor market institutional arrangements.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical background of 
the study, drawing on literatures on institutional work, categories, and the labor market as a 
highly institutionalized field. The methods and the case used in this article are described in 
the third section. The findings are then presented in the fourth section and discussed in the 
fifth. The conclusion opens new research avenues regarding social innovation diffusion and 
institutional work in complex settings. 
 
1. Theoretical background  
 
The diffusion of social innovation as institutional work 
 
If social innovators seek not only to solve a particular social problem at a local level but also 
to act on the broader system at the origin of the problem, they are inevitably engaged in 
institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby 2006; Lawrence et al. 2009). In emerging fields, this 
typically takes the form of individual and collective action to create new institutional 
arrangements able to respond to the identified social problem, thereby leading to new 
organizational forms (Lee & Pennings 2002; Rao & Kenney 2008; Rao et al. 2000; Romanelli 
& Fiol 2008; Tracey et al. 2011), markets (Khaire & Wadhwani 2010; Santos & Eisenhardt 
2009) or market categories (Khaire & Wadhwani 2010; Zuckerman 1999). Following 
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Nicholls (2010), these new arrangements may be “radical” and seek to overthrow some 
established institutions, or, more often, “incremental” or “institutional”, only challenging the 
established institutions when they hinder their development and with a relatively focused 
scope (e.g. fair trade, microfinance, integration of low-skilled workers, etc.).  
 
In highly institutionalized fields such as the one considered here (see below), bottom-up 
innovation diffusion by non-dominant actors necessarily implies a challenge insofar as 
dominant actors are likely to oppose changes in the rules of the game and thus in the power 
configuration in the field (Hargadon & Douglas 2001).  Institutional change seems possible 
only in certain conditions, for instance: when a coalition of unsatisfied actors within the field 
manages to build a credible alternative (Schneiberg 2005); when social movements mobilize 
sufficient support to overthrow extant institutions, push dominant actors to significant 
changes, or successfully encourage alternatives (Sine & Lee 2009); when an external jolt 
jeopardizes the legitimacy of extant arrangements (Tost 2011); etc. Although institutional 
work typically requires inter-organizational collaboration (Phillips et al. 2000), change 
dynamics may also emerge from isolated actors who successfully experiment alternatives 
likely to attract support (Leblebic et al. 1991).  
 
Highly institutionalized fields are characterized not only by locking power configurations, but 
also by the presence of strongly established cognitive categories, the boundaries of which 
have been consolidated over time. Thus, innovations are likely to challenge these categories, 
if not from the beginning, at least in the process of their diffusion. In this case, actors will 
need not only records showing their ability to experiment an innovation within established 
categories, but also framing processes likely to convince audiences that it is desirable to 
extend these innovations across category boundaries, beyond their local experimentation 
cradle (Benford & Snow 2000; Sine & Lee 2009). 
 
Creating and modifying established categories 
 
Categories are used to simplify complex information by setting discriminating boundaries 
(Lamont & Molnár 2002). They can apply to any types of objects, in organization studies 
most typically organizational forms and markets (Khaire 2014; Khaire & Wadhwani 2010), 
but also other elements as will be examined here. Whatever the objects, creating new 
categories, modifying extant ones and searching for their diffusion is potentially problematic 
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in highly institutionalized fields, where actors and practices are structured with the help of 
categories that are clearly delineated and understood by field participants. New actors and 
practices are likely to be tolerated only to the extent that they can be clearly affiliated with 
extant categories (Aldrich & Fiol 1994). When this is not the case, actors will lack cognitive 
legitimacy and be ignored or contested by established actors (Tost 2011; Überbacher 2014). 
This may lead to lack of support by stakeholders such as consumers, public authorities, or 
investors (Navis & Glynn 2011; Zuckerman 1999's "illegitimacy discount"). 
 
Through institutional work, nevertheless, new categories may be experimented and extant 
categories modified, even in highly institutionalized fields (Lounsbury & Rao 2004; Rao et al. 
2005). New categories need to be connected to a certain extent with established ones, with the 
delicate balance of appearing at the same time as familiar and differentiated (Navis & Glynn 
2011). Beyond cognitive resonance, pragmatic and normative legitimacy must be created to 
garner support (Suchman 1995) to the new or modified categories. This legitimacy-building 
work may be undertaken even without large resources and power centrality, as observed by 
Leblebic and colleagues: “radically new practices that may evolve into conventions are most 
likely to be introduced by parties from the fringes of an interorganizational field […]. These 
players are the newer and/or less powerful participants, for whom experimentation is less 
costly in final outcomes and who are less likely to be sanctioned by more central players” 
(Leblebic et al. 1991: 358). To extend niche innovations to the broader field, actors also need 
to identify opportunities in the dominant arrangements (Jones et al. 2012) by exploiting 
institutional overlaps (Greenwood et al. 2011), contradictions (Battilana et al. 2009; Seo & 
Creed 2002) or voids (Mair et al. 2012).  
 
This paper seeks to contribute to this body of literature by exploring institutional work efforts 
in a particular context of institutional complexity, i.e. when the institutional arrangement is 
not field-specific but rather spans across different sectors. This is typically the case with 
cross-border regulations such as those related to employment that apply to a large array of 
sub-fields. Hence, at least two regulative levels (labor market and field-specific) overlap, 
which may create ambiguities. This paper explores how a marginal actor can exploit such 
ambiguities as opportunities for institutional work, more specifically through cross-border 
diffusion based on new combinations of roles and gradual extension of professional 
categories that gradually by-passes field-specific requirements. As will be shown here, this 
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ability to span borders is both an opportunity for growth and visibility, and a driving factor for 
opposition by established actors. 
 
Social innovation in the highly institutionalized labor regulation field 
 
Despite differences among countries and cultures, the European labor market is characterized 
by a set of prevalent features that have been at the core of the institutional model and the legal 
system for more than a century (Sapir 2005; Wilthagen & Tros 2004), including:  
• Bilateralism: the employment relationship structure is traditionally conceived as 
bilateral, i.e. between two parties: a single employer and an employee 
• Binary statuses: the labor market regulation is organized around two distinct statuses: 
salaried worker or self-employed worker. There have been virtually no other 
configurations considered in between these two statuses.  
• Standardized working conditions: the ideal employment contract, considered as 
allowing the best job quality and most widely promoted by public authorities, is the 
long-term and full-time employment contract 
 
In Belgium, the employment regulation also relies on these three legal principles. However, 
more than in other countries, the labor market regulation is highly institutionalized (Xhauflair 
& Pichault 2013). All rules are defined through a collective negotiation process, the 
participants and boundaries of which are clearly circumscribed. It is said to be “corporatist” as 
it is structured around three actors – the worker unions, the employer representatives and the 
state – who are exclusively responsible for all the decisions regarding the labor market 
regulation. There are three levels of collective negotiations: 1) interprofessional (i.e. 
transversal to all sectors), 2) sector-based, 3) specific to the company. No formal employment 
rules can be developed outside this institutional framework.  
 
Nevertheless, this institutional arrangement is increasingly questioned due to new realities of 
work and organizations, marked by the emergence of new actors and of new needs for 
flexibility and security (Sapir 2005; Wilthagen & Tros 2004). In Belgium as in many other 
European countries, public authorities are struggling to redesign the labor market regulation 
in order to meet these new needs. Yet, transforming the labor market regulation in coherence 
with the new realities of work and employment would mean scratching out the main 
categories on which regulation is based and create new ones, more adapted to the needs of the 
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workers and their users. This radical change would also endanger the very existence of the 
institutional actors (typically worker unions), or at least would require a deep transformation 
of these representative institutions (Regalia 2006; Xhauflair & Pichault 2013).  
 
However, micro-level actors have not waited for a top-down shift and engage in different 
types of "bricolage" in order to deal with their new needs of flexibility and security. They 
notably create new employment schemes that challenge the basic assumptions of the 
employment regulation (Regalia 2006; Xhauflair & Pichault 2013). First, new multilateral 
employment schemes have been set up that triangulate the traditionally bilateral employment 
relationship (Davidov 2004; Havard et al. 2009): flexpools, umbrella companies, employers’ 
alliances, etc. As a consequence, new third party actors, new intermediaries in charge of the 
management of these new employment schemes, appear in the collective regulation 
landscape, but institutionally they are not allowed any role even if they take (part of) the 
employer legal responsibility (Regalia 2006; Xhauflair & Pichault 2013). The new 
employment schemes also favor the emergence of “in between” statuses, which do not fit the 
traditional distinction between professional categories, i.e. "salaried" versus "self-employed" 
worker. Finally, these new schemes take the “atypical” working conditions for granted and try 
to provide innovative solutions to secure these atypical workers, even if these solutions are far 
from the ideal-type of the full-time and long-term employment contract (Regalia 2006; 
Wilthagen & Tros 2004). The case of Smart perfectly illustrates this type of bottom-up 
innovation on the labor market. 
 
2. Methods 
 
To explore the diffusion of social innovations on the labor market, a qualitative study was 
chosen for several reasons (see Lee 1999; Marshall & Rossman 1995). First, new employment 
schemes such as those designed by Smart are particularly complex, raise reactions from a 
broad array of stakeholders, and lead to lobbying and political activism (Montgomery & 
Oliver 1996). We needed to acquire a good understanding of the scheme itself, and to collect 
views and representations regarding the innovation, the innovator (Smart) and its impact on 
the field from a vast array of stakeholders. Second, as social innovation is usually a long-term 
process, we needed to get a longitudinal understanding of the phenomenon, from the 
emergence of the scheme, its progressive broadening, to its current impact on the Belgian 
labor market.  
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Data collection 
Therefore, we carried out, between August 2012 and June 2013, 30 semi-structured 
interviews with key informants, including 12 internal stakeholders (1 founder/managing 
director, 6 managers, 3 members of the research department, 1 artist member of the Board of 
the Foundation, 1 former employee) and 18 external stakeholders such as artists and creative 
professionals (4), clients/users (2 theatre producers), professional associations (2 worker 
union representatives, 2 associations representing artists), competitors (2 representatives of 
the temporary work federation, 2 representatives of temporary work agencies), 2 politicians, 
and 1 representative of the public administration (National Employment Office). We also met 
a journalist who investigated and wrote a highly cited article on the Smart case. The 
interviews with the internal stakeholders focused on the history of Smart, the services offered 
to members, and the relationships of Smart with members and external stakeholders. The 
interviews with external stakeholders aimed at grasping their understanding and 
representations about the new employment scheme, about Smart as an organization and about 
the impacts of its actions and development on the broader arts and labor fields. All the 
interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
A document analysis was also conducted. Relevant internal documents, including 27 
publications, reports and position papers from the research department, were scanned for 
information on growth strategies, target audience delineation and stakeholder perceptions. 
The position papers by the Smart research department were particularly useful to capture how 
Smart deliberately aimed to disseminate its vision and arguments about securing the careers 
of creative professionals. Finally, 12 relevant newspaper articles commenting on the growth 
of Smart were analyzed. 
 
Data analysis 
The data analysis consisted in several stages. First, a detailed narrative of the creation and 
development of Smart was written in order to develop a shared understanding of the case and 
to identify key events. This narrative was presented to Smart’s interviewed persons, yielding 
interesting feed-back and discussions (also recorded and transcribed). Second, a thematic-type 
content analysis was carried out on the interview transcripts and documents collected. The 
data were chronologically structured into three key periods identified in the case narrative 
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(see table 1). These periods correspond to consistent associations of both internal elements 
(Smart’s organizational form, size and target audience delineation) and external situation 
(legal environment and stakeholder reactions). The evolutions from one period to another can 
thus be seen as key stages of the institutionalization process as reported by the interviewees 
and in the documents. For each of these three periods, we structured the interview and 
document quotes around several issues and levels of analysis related to Smart: (1) content and 
objectives of the new employment scheme, (2) target audience and needs, (3) organizational 
form, (4) dialogue between Smart and its stakeholders-competitors, (5) institutional 
landscape. For each of these themes, explanations and justifications by Smart representatives 
and comments and critiques by external stakeholders were contrasted in order to reconstitute 
dialectic conversations. Third, we gathered these first-order issues into second-order 
conceptual issues (Strauss & Corbin 1990) related to the literature and the research questions, 
i.e. (1) diffusion of the innovation, (2) impacts of the diffusion and (3) cross-level interactions 
between the innovation and the innovator. This analytical process was iterative, identifying 
themes and connecting them to relevant literature. Finally, tables were built to summarize the 
data structure consistently with our theoretical dimensions. Some of these thematic tables will 
be presented to support our findings, while others will be illustrated by selected quotes.  
 
3. The case: Smart 
 
In Belgium as in many other western countries, the arts sector is a field where people have 
precarious employment statuses and where specific employment solutions are sought. In the 
late nineties, in Belgium, this need appeared quite strikingly through a controversial incident, 
when a young writer was compelled to reimburse the unemployment benefits she received 
while she was writing a book. This generated a huge mobilization by artists, protests and 
awkward debates, and ended up in a new legal provision for artists, facilitating the entitlement 
to social benefits. However, such solutions were adopted to answer the expressed needs in an 
isolated, ad hoc manner, thus not fundamentally altering the global functioning of the labor 
market.  
 
In this context, in 1998, a band manager and an engineer coming from the industrial sector 
teamed up with the aim of providing a practical answer to these artists and creative 
professionals working intermittently and on a project basis. They created Smart, a small 
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mutual nonprofit organization acting as an intermediary appointed to manage the contracts 
concluded between its members performing an artistic activity and their clients or principals. 
Beyond this service, Smart’s mission was to protect its members and to defend their interests 
while securing the surrounding legal framework. Smart (now SMartbe) scaled up quickly: in 
2012, the organization counted 173 employees and 50.000 members, and invoiced 130 
millions €. The organization is also developing in other European countries (France, Sweden, 
Spain and Austria). 
 
The employment scheme provided by Smart is challenging the Belgian labor market 
regulation. The organization plays an intermediary role between its members performing an 
artistic activity and their clients or principals, providing its member artists a better (income) 
security, through facilitating the entitlement to social benefits. Two main tools are used by the 
organization to provide security to its members: (1) employment contracts and (2) activity 
management. 
 
(1) The “employment contract” is a way of guaranteeing the artist pay and avoiding the artist 
the burdens of paperwork and debt collection. Smart acts as an intermediary appointed to 
manage the agreement concluded by the two parties, i.e. writing the contracts, invoicing the 
client, and paying a wage to the artist in the framework of an employment contract (see 
Figure 1). 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
  
(2) Smart’s members are considered as entrepreneurs, who accumulate contracts, mobilize a 
variety of funding sources, take certain professional expenses into account over the long term, 
and construct projects on a wide scale. The Activity tool allows members to act as self-
employed while still being guaranteed a form of stability, as they benefit from an employee 
status and the administrative services of Smart, as well as the support of an advisor. A 
piggybank is created for each activity (the budget) and managed by each member (who fills in 
purchased orders, invoices for copyright transfers, etc.). It can be used to finance employment 
contracts for the artist or for other staff, to pay expenses, monthly leasing payments, etc. The 
activity allows great freedom for members while keeping the paperwork minimal and 
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guaranteeing members’ salaries or fees, regardless of whether the client has paid the invoice, 
thanks to a Mutual Guarantee Fund. Figure 2 summarizes the activity tool. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
With its new scheme and its rapid growth, Smart created turmoil on the Belgian labor market, 
facing increased resistance by worker unions, interim companies, public authorities and 
others. The following table shows the evolution of Smart in terms of structure, services, target 
audience and stakeholder environment throughout three periods of time which have been 
delineated by major events described in the next section. This table shows the mutual 
interactions between Smart and its environment, documenting how its role as a social 
innovator and an institutional entrepreneur has evolved over time with the gradual extension 
of its roles and target audience across traditional category boundaries. 
 
Table 1: Main features of the three identified periods 
 
 1st period 
1998-2003 
2nd period 
2003-2011 
3rd period 
From 2012 on 
Structure • Mutual non-profit 
organization 
• Umbrella private foundation 
(not philanthropic) + 
different legal entities with 
non-profit or cooperative 
statuses 
• Planning to transform the non-
profits into cooperative 
structures with a social aim 
• European development (France, 
Sweden, Spain) 
Services • Third party payer 
• Legal employer 
(since 2003) 
• Paper work 
• Legal employer 
• Professional and 
representative association 
• Temporary work agency 
Equipment leasing 
• Smart Immo 
• Planning to create a new legal 
structure dedicated to project-
based work, with a social aim 
cooperative status 
• European services structure for 
artists 
• Supporting legal actions 
Target 
audience 
• Creative artist • Creative professionals • Project-based workers 
Stakeholder 
attitudes 
(worker 
unions, 
competitors, 
public 
authorities) 
• Unions and 
competitors: No 
consideration  
• Public authorities: 
tolerance 
• Unions and competitors: 
claim that Smart is in 
breach with labor law 
• Public authorities: legal and 
fiscal controls + « artist 
hunt » 
• Unions: negotiations + 
supporting legal actions 
• Competitors: planning to copy 
some Smart services 
• Public authorities: legal 
analysis, collaboration and 
possibly recuperation ambitions 
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The next section details this process of growth and diffusion, analyzing the new combinations 
of roles and extensions of audience category delineations by Smart, the evolution of 
stakeholder stances from tolerance to opposition and partial adoption, and the impact on both 
the institutional environment of labor regulation and Smart as a pioneer social innovator. 
 
4. Findings 
 
5.1. First period: addressing the needs of artists 
 
Smart’s creation as an answer to institutional gaps 
 
Smart emerged to respond to a number of failures and gaps in the work organization of artists. 
At that time, artists had precarious statuses, due to their work characterized by intermittency 
and multi-employership. Dealing with the administrative complexity engendered by this 
particular way of working was a real obstacle course, either for artists themselves, who do not 
necessarily had the administrative and legal skills required to manage their career and 
preserve their entitlement to unemployment benefits, or for the employers and contractors, 
who felt insecure due to the absence of clear public policies regarding artists employment 
(and unemployment) situations. The two founders of Smart developed answers to what they 
identified as “a fault on the labor market continent” (Smart co-founder). 
 
Most stakeholders also positively welcomed the solutions offered by Smart, recognizing the 
pressing problems facing artists. As table 2 shows, politicians, the public administration as 
well as the legal actors welcomed the emergence of Smart, at least as long as their scope 
remained focused on artists in the original sense of the term (see below).  
 
Table 2: Identifying and exploiting institutional gaps in the employment system 
 
"The creation of Smart suited many people" (Representative of the secretary of state against fiscal and social 
fraud) 
 
"The state was interested because there were many failures in the system" (Representative of the Association 
of Professional Art Technicians) 
 
“The founders have created a way of organizing that did not exist. They allowed people to work autonomously 
but in a mutual system” (Newspaper interview of SMartbe recently appointed director) 
 
"The politicians accept us because they understand the tool. But they could break it, make things more 
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difficult. Yet they know it's not in their interest. So they just want to limit the number of people who can benefit 
from it" (Artist and SMartbe administrator) 
 
"We've been contacted by the work legal prosecution office who immediately clarified that they weren't there 
to undermine Smart" (Director of the SMartbe Foundation) 
 
 
Early recognition and growth, new services 
 
Smart grew at a very fast pace. After one year of existence, Smart counted 1000 members, 
and the number of employment contracts managed was expanding each year. This growth was 
quite hard to manage for a small organization that was discovering a system without clear 
boundaries. One of the two founders admits: “It was really bricolage, we were totally 
blundering. We did not even know if what we were doing was legal. We just tried to be good 
enough in order not to make fatal errors.” (Smart co-founder) 
 
However, thanks to the cash flow generated by the 6.5% fee charged by Smart on all 
contracts, Smart was able to offer its members a mutual guarantee fund that allows paying 
wages even if the ordering party has not yet paid the balance. Beyond the representation of 
artists and the social secretariat services, Smart developed new services to members (advice, 
consulting, etc.). While stretching the limits of legality, Smart was still recognized as a 
legitimate actor in the field. Quite interestingly, Smart was invited by the regional public 
authorities in charge of arts and culture, to join the “National Artists Platform” mandated to 
prepare the negotiation about a new “artist status”.  
 
The 2002 Law 
 
Following the debates in this National Artists Platform, a law was voted in 2002, which 
defined a new status for artists. Smart considered this law as an approbation of its practices 
and demands. The aim of the law was to facilitate administrative procedures and to bring 
artists out of undeclared work, while offering them a beneficial scheme. From that time, even 
without a working contract between the ordering party and the artist, the latter was considered 
as a salaried worker by the social security, and the ordering party was considered as the 
employer.  
 
The law also provided a new definition of the artist that went beyond the previous definition 
focused on “performing artist”. Under pressure of Smart and other stakeholders, the new 
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definition extended the notion of “artist” to every creator, performer or interpret of paid 
artistic work, in the audio-visual, plastic art, music, literature, entertainment, theatre or dance 
sectors.  
 
Lastly, the intermittent nature of the artistic work was taken into account regarding the artists’ 
entitlement to social benefits. The entitlement was facilitated through the conversion of 
“cachets” (or pay-per-service) into their equivalent in working days. There was also a 
particular rule for performing artists and technicians who were allowed to maintain the 
highest unemployment benefit rate during 12 months.  
 
5.2. Second period: extending roles and audiences 
 
New roles: employer and multiple service provider 
 
The 2002 law was a determining factor for the development of Smart, and reinforced the 
scheme designed by Smart, as it clarified its operating framework and appeared to approve 
the options taken by Smart. In 2002, Smart became third-party payer, which means that Smart 
pays the artist on behalf of the artist’s user. Therefore, Smart became the artist’s employer, 
and was responsible for all employer’s duties, such as social security payments, withholding 
tax and VAT.  
 
From 2004, Smart expanded its range of services to members. Smart launched its Activity 
tool (see case description), allowing artist members to autonomously manage complex 
projects inside the Smart legal structure, and facilitated by the numerous computerized tools 
made available to members. In line with the mutual guarantee fund, Smart also started to 
provide financial service facilities, as an alternative to bank and credit institutions most often 
reluctant to support artists. Smart offered several advantages to members: a user-friendly 
platform, wage optimization advices, facilitated access to social benefits, and a range of 
services to ease the lives of its members.  
 
First extension of target audience: from artists to creative professionals 
 
Importantly, the target audience was significantly enlarged, far beyond what the 2002 law had 
prescribed. Smart accepted as members numerous professions such as beauticians, (graphic) 
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designers, craftsmen, translators, masseurs, etc. In brief, many workers whose professional 
activities are creative, project-based and/or intermittent and who did not fit well in the 
Belgian social security legal framework. The research director of Smart explains: “We wanted 
to avoid entering into the logic of an artistic discipline: Smart aims all artistic services, 
whatever the sector. What makes the strength of Smart is to accept non-artistic services. Some 
of them are not considered artistic in the legal sense, but refer to creative professions. We 
accept them because the artists also offer non-artistic services to better earn their lives, and 
we want to offer them the facilities of a unique counter." Thanks to this target audience and 
service extensions, the membership exploded, reaching 43.000 members in 2011 and a large 
diversity of professions.  
 
Interestingly, as table 3 shows, the blurry notions of artist and artistic work were recognized 
by several stakeholders who supported the extension of the definition up to a certain extent. 
Yet, Smart was quickly criticized for exploiting this ambiguity and extending its membership 
far beyond what reasonably entered the scope of arts and creation. 
 
Table 3: The ambiguous definition of artist and artistic work  
 
"The definition of what is an artist will never be clear. Each one of us is somehow an artist. What matters is to 
regulate how the workers are best protected" (Representative of the national employment office) 
 
"Over time there have been several definitions of what is an artist, what is artistic work, according to the law 
on unemployment and the law on social security for salaried workers" (Director of SMartbe Foundation) 
 
"[The government work policies] are limited to the artists. We have a problem with that. We would like [these 
policies] to include all the people around. An artist, that's a reduced and undefinable notion. Smart is criticized 
but no one can define what is an artist" (Representative of the Association of Professional Art Technicians) 
 
"The national employment office already divides us between artists, creators, technicians,... There are many 
professions that are not in their database. It's normal that they don't know if they don't practise the jobs. Yet 
they are deciding who is artist or not. This makes no sense!" (Representative of the Association of Professional 
Art Technicians) 
 
"The definitions are everything but clear, and so the workers affiliated with Smart can decide if they want to 
frame their work as artistic or not" (Journalist) 
 
Stakeholder critiques on Smart’s confusion of roles 
 
Until then, most stakeholders had considered Smart as useful for a marginal part of workers, 
i.e. artists. Hence, its employment scheme remained rather unnoticed in the broader area of 
work regulation. However, in the 2000s, Smart gained considerable visibility, extended its 
services and its target audience and became very profitable.  
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Worker unions, for instance, had long considered Smart with benevolence. In Belgium, 
worker unions are intermediaries between the unemployed and the federal public service for 
social security. Consequently, they were fully aware of Smart’s activities, being in charge of 
the administrative processing of Smart’s members requests to unemployment benefits 
entitlement.  
 
However, Smart started to position itself as a union of artists, taking advantage of the fact that 
most artists were not (efficiently) represented by conventional worker unions, notably because 
artists are not “conventional” workers. Smart thus claimed this representation role: "We 
manage to unite workers around tools and services that don't compromise their personal 
identity. They have both their autonomy and a collective representation structure in which 
they don't need to be actively involved. The target public interested in our services was 
already on the boundary between independent and salaried work. These are jobs that require 
autonomy but that couldn't either be in total isolation." (Director of SMartbe-APMC1).  
 
This role was acknowledged by public authorities who invited Smart at several negotiation 
processes on artists, as a representative body of the latter. A politician summarizes this 
recognition: "There are different clans in the artistic sector and artists weren't able to 
structure themselves and have a spokesperson. Smart structured itself to be able to defend 
and represent artists. Of course they have their interests, it's debatable, but they answered a 
need, and they allowed to take many things out of illegality, so it's not too bad" 
(Representative of the Green Party). This was also acknowledged by other experts in the field, 
for instance: "The artists aren't able to come together in a network and this is a gap that 
Smart exploits by claiming to be an association that represents artists". (Consultant from a 
social office for artists) 
 
This move, however, was heavily criticized by worker unions, as admitted by Smart’s APMC 
Director: “the worker unions woke up because we were eating on their plate". As shown in 
table 4, this led to frontal opposition not only by worker unions but also by other stakeholders 
of the employment sphere who did not recognize Smart as a representative body and criticized 
the confusion that Smart created with the role of worker unions. 
 
 
                                                1	  APMC/	  Association	  of	  the	  Creative	  Professions	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Table 4: Critiques on Smart’s confusion with worker union roles 
 
“They pretend to be a worker union whereas they are absolutely not one. It's very detrimental for the sector. 
They're not a worker union because they have neither the logic, the philosophy nor the legal structure." (Art 
service demander) 
 
"By doing this, they fragilize the organization of artists through unions. They take the place of worker unions 
without taking the role of negociation. I thinks there's something very problematic. [...] How can Smart, as 
defender of the workers, negotiate with itself to sign a collective work agreement? The dialectic between the one 
who has the statute of salaried worker and a boss is necessary. By occupying both places, Smart kills this 
dialectic."  (Director of a theatre school) 
 
"We met them to understand what they do, how, and talk with them. I remain unsatisfied, because they maintain 
the confusion. When they talk, it's Smart, and Smart claims they speak for 45.000 people. But the members do 
not necessarily agree with [what they say]!" (Worker union representative) 
 
"They claim to have the truth, they are defending the artists. But they don't have a mandate to represent the 
artists! They proclaim themselves as representing the artists, but it's not the case. And still from the inside that's 
their message" (ex-Smart employee) 
 
 
Another set of critiques came from temporary work agencies and other competitors. They 
accused Smart of unfair competition mainly because, as already mentioned, Smart acts as the 
artists’ employer, paying them their wage and charging the service purchaser. However, most 
competitors considered that Smart did not fulfil all the employer’s responsibilities and thus 
created confusion for the artists and the service purchasers. Table 5 summarizes this set of 
critiques. 
 
Table 5: Critiques on Smart’s confusion with employer’s role 
 
"For the service providers, Smart is the employer. But it's well written in the general conditions, Smart is not the 
employer. They've had trouble with that ambiguity" (Consultant from a social office for artists) 
 
"Part of the sector considers that Smart contributes to diluting the responsibilities of employers vis-à-vis the 
artists" (Director of a theatre) 
 
"Smart erases the distinction between worker unions and employers. They put themselves in between the two [...] 
So they contribute to deprofessionalizing the profession because they take the employer's responsibility away 
from the profession" (Director of a school for actors)  
 
"Smart is only an intermediary [between the artist and the service purchaser] but they present themselves as a 
social office, they play with this ambiguity. As Smart is not an employer, they don't respect the work agreements 
and salaries. [...] This is unfair competition" (Director of legal affairs, Federation of temporary work companies) 
 
"Why do we need to respect the employers' obligations with all the associated costs whereas the Smart system is 
tolerated? The whole system built for 20 years in the temporary work sector is thrown away when the Smart 
system is tolerated, because it's much more interesting financially for the employers" (Director of legal affairs, 
Federation of temporary work companies) 
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Stakeholder critiques on Smart’s size and extended target audience 
 
More generally, stakeholders became impressed by the size reached by Smart, and by the 
increasing diversity of its membership. "Smart has really become a pool for many professions 
outside the artistic world", complained the legal director of the federation of temporary work 
agencies, "I would never have thought that it would be possible to grow so massively without 
the authorities putting legal barriers". Or: "Unbelievable things are made legal through 
Smart. And the reactions are very slow" (Representative of the Association of Professional 
Art Technicians) 
 
Temporary agencies and worker unions, although traditionally sworn enemies, then joined 
their forces to lobby public authorities and limit Smart’s activities. They complained at the 
labor prosecution office. This happened in 2008, in the economic crisis context, when 
politicians were also trying to rationalize public budgets. The pressure of a large political 
party put an end to the tolerance that Smart had enjoyed until then. "During ten years, the 
national labor office had a more 'generous' interpretation of the law, then they decided to 
come back to a more literal reading. The official reason was the abuses, but they could never 
give clear figures […]. The unofficial reason is that among worker unions there were many 
complaints about Smart's role."  (Representative of the Green Party).  
 
Reorganization to answer critiques 
 
The labor prosecution office determined that it lacked jurisprudence about the issue, and was 
not competent to define who is an artist and who is not (see also table 3). As stated by a labor 
prosecution officer, “at the labor prosecution office, nobody had any prerequisite knowledge, 
as there was no pending disputes. There is no real artist status, only some legal provisions, 
which have not all been conceived for artists. There is no real consolidated code (…). I don’t 
have legitimacy to define who’s an artist and who is not”. The labor prosecution office 
merely recommended that Smart clarify its structure and activities.  
 
"We've been contacted by the work legal prosecution office who immediately clarified that 
they weren't there to undermine Smart", says the Director of the SMartbe Foundation. A 
collaboration was started with the labor prosecution office to clarify Smart’s set of activities 
considered obscure and, consequently, dubious. For the sake of clarity, Smart then decided to 
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split its structure from a single non-profit organization into several entities, with various legal 
statuses depending of the respective core businesses2, and all held by a private foundation.  
 
The foundation was named SMartbe, and was the outcome of an urging need to secure the 
organization’s assets. Indeed, Smart had become very rich, and members in the General 
Assembly of the association had diverging views about how to manage these assets. The latter 
were then transferred to the new SMartbe foundation with, as stated by one of the founders, 
“the aim to dissociate financial issues and democratic issues and to protect the organization 
from internal actors who tried to get control of it”.  
 
The private foundation SMartbe defines the strategy and manages the whole structure, 
providing support services in HRM, accounting, etc. to the member entities. It is responsible 
for the ethical use of financial resources, and for the continuity and expansion of the 
structures, of which the foundation is the major shareholder.   
 
The « Artist hunt » and the redefinition of the target audience 
 
The National Employment Office (ONEM) had initially been rather tolerant towards Smart. 
However, after the complaints by the worker unions and temporary work federation, the 
ONEM seemed to discover the situation: "We noticed that the number of people claiming to 
be 'artists' is increasingly high [...] we didn't know that there were as many people affiliated 
with Smart as salaried workers" (ONEM representative).  
 
The ONEM considered the rise of unemployed people with the artist status as an abuse, and 
started to control more strictly these “said-artists”. This was the beginning of what has been 
called “the ONEM crisis” or, as titled by the artists themselves, the “artist hunt”. This change 
                                                
2 The new SMartbe holding is composed of five entities : 
• The Secretariat for Casual Workers, with a non-profit organization status, which manages the artistic 
employment contracts that fit with the “artist status” 
• The Temporary Work Agency, a private limited company, ironically named the Interim Palace, which 
manages the artistic employment contracts that do not fit with the “artist status” and non artistic labor 
• Productions Associées, a non-profit organization offering the framework for the development of creative 
projects 
• The Professional Association of the Creative Trades (APMC), for lobbying and defending “creative” 
members 
• Matlease, a cooperative company, for lending equipment and providing financial services and credits to 
members 	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in the ONEM stance generated tensions and legal disputes. Smart decided to support members 
willing to dispute the ONEM decision to deny them their entitlement to unemployment 
benefits. Smart argued that there was confusion between the “artist status” and the Smart 
membership. The organization blamed the narrowness and the impreciseness of the very 
definition of the “artist” (see table 2). 
 
While engaging in disputes with the National Employment Office, Smart decided to refocus 
on its core business and to redefine its target. Year after year, the members’ occupations had 
become increasingly distant from the artistic field, including gardening, consulting, 
massaging activities, etc., engendering suspicions and allegations even from within, for 
instance: "Smart is an excellent tool from the moment they stayed in the little nich they had, 
which is to make the link between the artists and the job providers. Then, there was good 
work to do, help to bring. But from the moment they enlarged, it was about estheticians, 
masseuses,..." (former Smart employee) 
  
In 2011, Smart redefined the boundaries of its target audience: from 2012, the organisation 
only accepted members whose activities fall into the “creative” scope: “To become a member, 
you now have to work in an area which is part of what we call ‘the creative professionals’. 
This definition includes: artistic and creative professions; technical-artistic professions; art-
related professions (production, broadcasting, etc.); all professions that have historically 
been part of SMartbe and have many things in common with creative professionals: 
journalism, communication, translation, socio-cultural activities organisation, and 
professions relating to the web, training and events” (Smart presentation brochure, 2012). 
This focus back on the core business aimed to legitimize Smart’s demands to public 
authorities and to secure the defence of the members. However, all members who had 
registered before 2012 were allowed to remain full members, whatever their occupations.  
 
5.3. Third period: integrating “project-based work” into the labor regulation 
 
Integration of Smart’s scheme into Belgian and European institutional landscape 
 
The National Labor Council (NLC) is the main consultative body in the Belgian social 
dialogue system. Composed of representatives of worker unions and employer federations, 
this body advises the Belgian federal government regarding employment policy issues. The 
  21 
NLC was asked to adopt an opinion about a review of the artist status. Although several 
opponents to the Smart scheme were part of the NLC, the notice published in July 2012 by 
the consultative body globally maintained the existing system, with slight modifications only. 
Smart therefore considered that it was cleared of abuses allegations and that it could maintain 
its different services. According to Smart, another proof for that was that 150 Smart’s 
members, excluded by the ONEM from the right to unemployment benefits because they 
could not prove that their occupations were of an artistic nature, won their cases against the 
ONEM at the Labor Tribunal. 
 
Although there has been no major dispute involving Smart since the 2012 events, the ONEM 
is still exercising a strict control of the artists asking for entitlement to unemployment 
benefits, and new court cases are being processed. However, this does not impede Smart from 
further developing its scheme and proposing a wider range of services to its members.  
 
Smart is also developing similar initiatives at the European level, together with partners in 
Sweden, France, Spain or Austria. Smart Belgium thus shares its experience and knowledge 
to other organizations and tries to build its expertise about labor market rules in European 
countries, in order to ease and secure their projects across the borders of countries and activity 
sectors. Smart has joined European networks and think tanks, such as IETM (International 
Network for contemporary performing arts), ENCATC (European Network on Cultural 
management and Cultural Policy Education), Culture Action Europe, etc. Smart is thus 
developing visibility and legitimacy at the European level, as an expert organization 
representing individual artists. Through this European development, Smart also hopes to 
obtain a better recognition for its projects in Belgium. 
 
Second extension of target audience: from creative professionals to project-based workers 
 
Although they have had to take into account the opposition from several actors in the field, 
Smart has continued to imagine new solutions for its current and potential members. The 
organization now wants to provide solutions to all workers concerned by project-based work, 
and suffering from the uncertainty and discontinuity associated with it. Interestingly, Smart 
claims that its strategy and development are driven by the members themselves, whose 
working conditions are increasingly characterized by project-based organisation. "There has 
been a clarification of our area of action, of our target public. The work prosecutor's office 
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wanted to understand why Smart has extended its activities to non-artists. We explained that 
historically, Smart was created to answer the needs of artists and technicians, and then 
professions that are associated and necessary in the production chain. Smart then opened 
itself to other professions because the people are forced to diversify the types of services, and 
they do subsistence services outside the artistic world. These multiple activities are 
problematic and Smart wanted to provide a global response. Actually, Smart still targets the 
same public, but it's that public that enlarges its activities. » (Director of SMartbe 
Foundation).  
 
Multiple arms for multiple roles 
 
Somewhat chastened by its recent problems with public authorities, Smart tries to stay on the 
safe side. The organization is planning to create, apart from Smart, a new structure for this 
expanding audience of project-based workers. "Due to external pressures, we've had to 
reduce the activities, but we've kept the professions associated with the evolution of society 
towards project-based work (computer engineer, journalist, translator,...). We would like to 
create a new structure for the people who work on a project basis, even for what is not 
explicitly artistic. The system evolves, we have to secure workers" (Director of the research 
office, SMartbe). The ambition of developing new solutions and diffusing them onto the 
whole labor market remains rather clear, as suggested by the newly appointed director: “The 
creative professionals are in fact the forerunners of what will be the organization of work and 
employment in the future. They like to have autonomy while constantly connecting with other 
professionals. However in the current system their project-based work brings discontinuity 
and precariousness and we want to build solutions for all the professionals in this situation”. 
(Newspaper interview of SMartbe new director) 
 
However, Smart still struggles with its different roles. On the one side, the organization 
identifies itself as a simple service provider, designing tools to support the career paths of 
artists and project-based workers: "We want to offer adapted tools whatever [the workers'] 
choices: salaried worker, independent worker, entrepreneur,... What's at the core of our 
action is not to employ everyone, to defend a particular status, but rather to offer tools that 
allow [workers] to manage their activity and to secure the different situations" (Director of 
SMartbe Foundation). On the other side, Smart still wishes to remain a key representative 
actor at Belgian and European levels. This generates tensions inside the different entities of 
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the foundation. "There's a tension in Smart between the two missions which are "providing 
tools to users", our entrepreneurial job, and "representing users". In terms of tools, it's not a 
problem to enlarge the public, as long as the tools work, the users don't necessarily need to 
identify themselves with the carrying structure, they're just users. But it's different in the 
representation structure, where a strong identity is a matter of credibility. I think we should 
develop a new association to defend the rights of non-artistic intermittent workers. The 
problem is that we already have so much work to defend artists and creative workers: who 
will take the lead and defend non-artistic intermittent workers? That field is even more 
mined." (APMC Director).  
 
Stakeholders: supporting the innovation rather than the innovator 
 
Whatever happens to Smart in the future, it seems that the employment scheme designed by 
Smart for creative professionals is less and less challenged as such. At most, labor market 
authorities are tightening the conditions of access to unemployment benefits for those who 
claim the artist status, and are carrying out reinforced controls.  
 
Hence, the critiques on Smart have shifted away from the content of its actions and the scope 
of its target audience, to focus more on the organization itself. As table 6 shows, two main 
critiques have been formulated: the combination of roles leading to a “multiple-arms” 
structure, and the private nature of Smart leading to a commercial, profit-making image. 
 
Table 6: Critiques on the multiple-arms and private structure 
 
"What annoys us with Smart, it's the tentacles. Who speaks when Smart speaks? If they want to be a representing 
association, ok, but is that compatible with the role of employer? With the role of material renting? I understand 
the marketing of SMart, with a unique name, but I think it weakens them. Everybody wants their hide, but not the 
same hide. So they get many enemies because of their ambiguity" (Worker union representative) 
 
"Smart for project-based work? Yes, but which Smart?" (Representative of a worker union) 
 
“They're confusing all their projects" (Representative of the Green Party) 
 
"Material leasing, activity management, artistic and non-artistic contracts, advice, legal support, fairs,... we 
have everything. We have so many products that the others don't have, that because of all that we're perceived 
as commercial, which we're not at all" (SMartbe manager responsible for Flanders) 
 
"We've had massive denigrations, so we spend our time justifying all the things we do" (SMartbe director in 
charge of representing the artists) 
 
"Defending artists is a matter of general interest [...]. SMart has become too big. It's always problematic to 
leave such an issue to a company rather than to the state" (Artist not using SMartbe) 
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The last quote illustrates a position taken by several stakeholders, which is to support the 
diffusion of the services and tools created by Smart, but disconnecting them from the Smart 
structure because of the reasons suggested above. In particular, public authorities have long 
shown interest in the schemes developed by Smart and could be tempted to recuperate them, 
as this politician confesses: "I think we'll need this [kind of mechanism] for project-based 
work. But separate from Smart, otherwise we're lost. They're confusing all their projects. […] 
In fact we need a public Smart” (Representative of the Green Party). In brief, Smart has 
managed to broadly diffuse its innovation in the field but, while doing so, it has extended its 
scope and combined several roles that have led to threatening its organizational legitimacy. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Category extension as a driver of both diffusion and opposition  
 
The findings first show how the roles of Smart and the delineation of its target audience 
categories has evolved parallel with the process of institutional work. The role evolved from 
simple service provider in terms of employment contracts up to a broad array of both 
employer and worker representation functions, thus unprecedentedly combining different 
roles traditionally taken by clearly separate actors on the labor market and challenging the 
well-established “employer-employee” divide. In a similar way, the target audience categories 
of Smart were redefined and extended from the traditionally accepted “artistic” field-related 
category up to a broader cross-field category of “creative professionals” and “project-based 
workers”. Whereas the first category was clearly field-specific, the second evolved outside of 
the arts sector and the third applied to a broad array of work configurations. Smart then 
profiled itself as the service organization able to support any insecure worker whatever its 
sector of activity. Thus, in both cases (roles and target audiences), Smart challenged the 
established categorizations by extending and combining them in unorthodox ways.  
 
These boundary-crossing categorizations were closely connected with the evolution of 
stakeholder stances and the broader environment. Typically, Smart took advantage of the 
initial ambiguity around the definition of “artist” to gradually extend its scope to creative 
professionals. It also took the opportunity of the poor representation of artists by traditional 
worker unions and of the ambiguities around the employer’s role to deploy itself as bridging 
these two distinct functions. Smart felt encouraged in this way by the initial tolerance of 
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competitors and the recognition by the state and other stakeholders welcoming solutions to 
artists’ needs. However, the dramatic growth of membership due to this extension led 
competitors and stakeholders to oppose Smart. The latter reacted superficially, by redefining 
its target audience without fundamentally changing it and by reorganizing its structure, adding 
new arms for each new role taken. Although contested, the creation of a multiple-arms 
structure enabled Smart to further extend its roles and target audience and to establish itself in 
a broad array of work fields. The category extension can thus be seen both as the emblem and 
as the driver of the institutional work project through which Smart sought to diffuse its new 
employment scheme and grow as an organization, echoing other studies examining the role of 
categories in institutional diffusion trajectories (Jones et al. 2012; Khaire 2014; Lounsbury & 
Rao 2004; Rao et al. 2005). 
 
In terms of target audience, Smart diffused its new employment scheme by creating a broad 
category cross-sector category that to a certain extent shares features of a “boundary object” 
(Briers & Chua 2001; Carlile 2002; Lainer-Vos 2013; Star & Griesemer 1989; Yakura 2002). 
Boundary objects are “artefacts of practice that are agreed and shared by communities, yet 
satisfy the informational requirements of each of them” (Sapsed & Salter 2004: 1518). The 
boundary object of the "project-based work" category thus enabled Smart to create 
interactions between subfields that previously appeared as distinct. From the starting point of 
the cultural subfield, the innovative scheme was abstracted from its initial experimental 
context and made available to other fields through the boundary category of project-based 
work. While this creation corresponds to the social innovators’ strategy to signal the 
challenge of protecting project-based workers, it remains unclear, however, if this boundary 
category will effectively be used by other actors to address the problem. In other words, the 
legitimacy of the newly created category is still not secured, even if the latest findings suggest 
partial adoption in the discourses by different types of “competitors” (worker unions and 
temporary work agencies). 
 
Institutional work outcome: diffusing the innovation rather than the innovator 
 
Second, the findings show contrasted behaviors when looking at the reactions of stakeholders 
both in and across fields regarding Smart and its employment scheme. On the one hand, the 
innovation itself, i.e. the new employment scheme, and its connection with the newly created 
"project-based work" category, received more appraisal and had a clear impact on the other 
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actors' practices. Most strikingly, the Belgian federation of temporary work agencies, after 
years of lobbying with the aim of prohibiting the scheme set up by Smart, gradually promoted 
the scheme among its members. Other stakeholders encouraged the development of the 
scheme but through another (typically public) organizational form. The gradual adoption and 
support of the scheme may bring the institutional innovation towards a level of irreversibility, 
even if this might happen at the expense of Smart itself. 
 
The findings, especially the most recent stances, show that Smart’s creation and diffusion, 
together with other supporting stakeholders (such as the networks at the European level), have 
had an important impact on the Belgian –and potentially European– labor market regulation. 
As presented in the second section, this regulation was initially only bilateral, seeing 
employers on the one side and employees on the other side, without any possibility to stand 
between or bridge the two roles. With the diffusion and replication of Smart’s scheme, the 
role of a third-party legal employer has been legitimized, although critiques remain from 
some worker unions. This type of third-party intervention challenging the bilateral, 
dichotomic system (“you’re either employer or employee”) has now been further diffused by 
other such schemes (Xhauflair & Pichault 2013), for instance worker cooperatives that form a 
new source of inspiration for the managers of Smart. 
 
Next, the binary categories of “salaried worker” and “independent worker” have also been 
challenged by the emergence and recognition of a third category of “project-based 
(intermittent) workers”. Thanks to Smart and other actors, this “boundary” category has 
grown from the sole arts sector to nearly all other sectors and is now getting structured and 
represented at the macro level of the employment dialogues (Davidov 2004; Regalia 2006). 
 
Finally, the standardized format for labor, through a homogeneous, full-time and unlimited 
working contract has also been challenged by Smart’s action. The heterogeneity of working 
situations has become increasingly accepted, and the protection organized taking into account 
this heterogeneity of contracts and situations (Regalia 2006). The focus of the regulation is no 
more the working conditions (through labor law) but the preservation of the entitlement to 
social rights (unemployment benefits, health insurance, retirement benefits, etc.). 
 
Yet, on the other hand, Smart as an institutional entrepreneur is heavily criticized precisely for 
transgressing field boundaries and exploiting ambiguities in its own interest. The private 
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nature of Smart is seen by several stakeholders as a contradiction with the general interest 
nature of the mission of protecting workers. Several voices thus call for a public system that 
would recuperate the Smart scheme from its initiator. Hence, we can clearly observe a 
diverging trajectory between the evolution of the innovation that has carved out its space into 
the institutional landscape, and the innovator whose organizational legitimacy and control 
over the innovation is no longer secured (see also Tracey et al. 2011). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this article was to contribute to understanding the diffusion trajectories of social 
innovations. This was achieved through a rich case study of a new employment scheme 
introduced by the Belgian non-profit organization Smart in the artistic sector and gradually 
diffused to other professional categories. The findings show how the roles and target audience 
were gradually extended and combined in new ways, causing both rapid growth and visibility 
for Smart and its new scheme, but also increasing suspicion from established actors. Thus, 
while the innovation pervades field boundaries thanks to cross-sector categorization, the 
innovator struggles to achieve sufficient organizational legitimacy in order to “follow” the 
diffusion of its innovation. 
 
Although the complexity of this case study makes clear-cut conclusions difficult and the long-
term outcomes of this diffusion work are not yet visible, we believe that our study brings two 
major contributions to research in this field. As a first contribution, our article highlights the 
role of category extension and combinations as pivotal in the context of institutional 
complexity. More particularly, when institutional layers overlap and when boundaries 
between categories (in this case professions) and thus fields are unclear, than it may be useful 
to exploit ambiguities by creating and addressing “boundary” categories that span across 
multiple fields. 
 
A second contribution is to suggest that the specific type of institutional work described 
above represents both the potential of responding to institutional ambiguities and favoring 
stakeholder adoption, and the threat of compromising the situation of the social innovator and 
institutional entrepreneur. The latter’s success is likely to depend on how it manages to 
engage in collaborative work, abandoning the monopoly over its innovation and convincing 
audiences of its non-opportunistic behavior. It is thus suggested that an institutional 
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entrepreneur diffusing a social innovation across field borders may face a dilemma of either 
sharing its innovation maximally while restraining its own ownership and growth prospects, 
or favoring the latter with the risk of frontal rejection by dominant actors. Other studies over 
longer time periods and in others contexts are required to examine and compare how different 
social innovators face this dilemma. More broadly, future research should examine 
institutional work around social innovations to highlight both the entrepreneurial strategies 
and the contextual factors that enable social innovations to scale up beyond their initial 
context and have a lasting impact on their institutional environment.
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